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ments of reformed or Aristotelian thinking in this sense: we might say in fact
that utilitarianism can only work adequately when it is employed by a properly-functioning human being. A Christian utilitarian need only say that the
principle of utility is the principle by which she identifies the good, but need
not accept a metaethical claim that the good is good because it brings pleasure. I think this is in accordance with Mill's own view. So perhaps there is
still some opportunity for cooperation and hybridization between Millian
and Christian thought. Its not that pleasure is the causal factor of goodness,
but rather, that pleasure is the constant coincidental along with goodness. So
aim for pleasure, and you will get goodness, so long as you are properly functioning (and this is why for Mill, as for Christians and Aristotelians, proper
training and habituation is so important).
Fundamentally, as Mill said in Utilitarianism, Christians do believe that
God is working to bring about the greatest happiness possible for the most,
or at least that that is what God wants. The idea that God uses apparent
evil for greater good, and that we see only through a mirror dimly are
Christian concepts which indicate a hope that ultimately, despite our limited capacities, God is working to bring about a best possible state of affairs
out of the apparent pain of our world. This tendency, at least, seems very
much in line with a utilitarian optimism, and a coinciding view that happiness and morality coincide.
Overall, Crimmin's book is a great resource for those interested in the
utilitarians of the 17th and 18th century, and it is essential reading for anyone seriously interested in the possibility of a religious utilitarianism. He
has done us a great service in making it available, and providing his
always insightful essays.
NOTES
1. J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, Edited by Roger Crisp (New York: Oxford, 1998)
3.10.65,79.

Natural and Divine Law: Reclaiming the Tradition for Christian Ethics, by Jean
Porter. Eerdmans Press, 1999, 340 pages. Paper $28.00.
DAVID C. WILLIAMS, Bethel College
Jean Porter characterizes her overall project in Natural and Divine Law:
Reclaiming the Tradition for Christian Ethics as "constructive as well as historical" (p. 16). The latter project reconstructs the moral arguments of 12th
century scholasticism, while the former attempts to take these arguments
and bring them to bear on contemporary ethical issues. The justification
for undertaking such a project is, according to Porter, that contemporary
natural law ethics have come to be associated with the "purely rational and
non-theological status of the natural law" (p. 16) leaving natural law insufficiently grounded in a distinctively Christian world view. In order to
challenge this dominant perspective Porter claims that "medieval natural
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law tltinkers did not attempt to derive moral principles from a supposedly
self-evident and fixed conception of human nature" (p. 17) because no
purely philosophical or non-Christian theory could have functioned in the
12th century environment of rapid social and institutional change. The
argument is that a reexamination of natural law as articulated by such
tltinkers as Gratian, Alexander of Hales, Albert the Great, Bonaventure and
Aquinas will yield a version of natural law that is uniquely Christian, yet
sufficiently grounded in human nature.
Porter argues that the 12th century scholasticism provides a much more
robust account of natural law than contemporary accounts (and here, of
course, she has in mind natural law theorists like Grisez and Finnis) precisely because contemporary accounts have, in their desire to avoid the
philosophical "sin" of deriving normative claims from descriptive claims,
purged from their explications of the natural law any notion of pre-rational
tendencies (only clearly defined by Porter much later in the book as "something that has an objective existence prior to our choice in the matter" p.
218). In denying for moral consideration those conditions of our nature
that we share with other animals, theorists like Grisez and Finnis bifurcate
falsely between nature (understood as the pre-rational features of our
being) and reason. According to Porter, "No scholastic would interpret
reason in such a way as to drive a wedge between the pre-rational aspects
of our nature and rationality" (p. 93).
To make the argument that the state of contemporary natural law theory
is in need of reform Porter maintains (following Richard Horsley) that one
can distinguish between two differing conceptions of natural law. There is
the Stoic conception where the source of what is reasonable and natural is
understood as the divine structure immanent in the fabric of the cosmos,
and the Platonic view which holds that the metaphysical address of the natural and the reasonable cannot be assigned to the empirical order. The
result is that in the Platonic tradition nature and reason are grounded not in
the immanent fabric of the cosmos, but in a transcendent noetic reality.
Porter's claim is that scholasticism was able to unite these two disparate
senses of natural law into a coherent account with the aid of Aristotelian
natural philosophy and its reentry into the philosophical conversation
mid-12th century. The influence of Aristotle and his understanding of
"nature" as the internal principles of change and motion in particular creatures allows for the development of 1) the notion of a good creation, and 2)
the idea that the world can be understood in terms of particular creatures
with particular essences rather than seeing nature as a Platonic world soul
or divine mind. "These commitments to the intelligibility and goodness of
nature proved to be central to the development of scholastic thinking on
the natural law. They provided a basis for drawing a connection between
nature and reason ... " (p. 75). The scholastic emphasis on our pre-rational
tendencies, then, builds into their account, according to Porter, an understanding of the nature that acknowledges Aristotelian "intrinsic characteristics" (p. 77), yet does not lose the Platonic notion of the "ordered totality
of all creatures" (p. 77).
Given this definition of nature, what can we say is fixed prior to the use
of reason and the interpretation of culture? It is not the case, according to
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Porter that the scholastics think that one can simply read off normative
claims from nature. "Nature in the sense of sheer facticity in not incorporated into the scholastics concept of natural law, because nature taken in
this sense cannot offer a basis for understanding the regularities of the nonhuman or social world" (p. 77). Porter would contend that a thinker like
Aristotle is right to hold that human beings have essences that form their
nature, but Porter maintains that the "scholastics do not begin with a fully
determinate account of human nature, on the basis of which they deduce
moral conclusions" (p. 79) and that there is room for "some agnosticism
about what human nature actually includes" (p. 79). In order to discover
what is natural and hence morally relevant Porter argues that the scholastics employ the "traditional distinction between what is natural in the
sense of existing prior to human customs and legal enactments, and what
is conventional or established by human design" (p. 77). The argument is
that because the Scholastics of the 12th century employ the distinction
between nature and convention they do not see nature as a set of clear facts
easily discerned apart from culture.
According to Porter, Scripture, along with nature and reason, is treated
by the scholastics as one of the "three mutually interpreting sources for
moral norms" (p. 122). We should not draw a sharp contrast between the
philosophical and the theological aspects of scholastic natural law theory:
"Not only does Scripture set the parameters for the scholastic concept of
natural law, but it is also itself interpreted in light of scholastic assumptions and beliefs about the natural law" (p. 137). This may appear to be a
circular form of argumentation, but Porter's claim is that is not vicious. In
her conclusion to Chapter Two she cites John Kekes and Bernard Williams
in support of the notion that all conceptions of human nature are evaluative and that fact and value are linked inextricably. Our reading of
Scripture is necessarily evaluative and does not provide us with pure facts:
"any theological oriented reading of Scripture will necessarily be guided
by some doctrinal and philosophical presuppositions" (p. 168) - function
as "mutually interpreting sources". This helps make sense of her claim
that reason, nature and Scripture function as "mutually interpreting
sources." Neither Scripture, nor reason, nor nature provides us with any
unadulterated facts and this is why we must put them in relationship with
each other. Scripture, then, provides a "theologically grounded interpretation of universal principles of moral action, which therefore apply to all
persons" (p. 145, my emphasis).
Traditional natural law theorists critical of Porter's interpretation are
sure to argue that her portrayal of scholastic natural law theory cannot
qualify as the Real McCoy since it does not claim that there is a set of objective moral truths that are known universally (even though persons might
chose to disregard those truths). The critic will assert that Porter's account
contains an irresolvable tension between the following two points.
Porter holds that the "starting point" (p. 76) for scholastic reflections on
natural law is the distinction between nature and convention. The distinction between nature and convention is usually understood as a distinction
between appearance and reality. For example, when Democritus declares,
"By convention (nomos) sweet, by convention bitter, but in nature (phusis)
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atoms and void" he is distinguishing between what is fixed and part of the
fabric of reality (phusis), and what is merely the product of a certain kind of
conventional judging (nomos). Or when Aristotle declares at the outset of the
Metaphysics that"All persons by nature (phusei) desire to know," he is denoting the fixed essence of what it means to be human. The term nature / phusis
refers to a fixed metaphysical reality that does not change despite the manner in which it is judged. As noted above, Porter characterizes the scholastics of the 12th century as ascribing to human nature certain "pre-rational
tendencies" (things having "objective existence" like procreation and the
formation of political communities) and seems to indicate that the notion of
"humanity" is not merely a mental construct but in fact a metaphysical reality (pp. 104-106). With respect to the nature/ convention distinction, then,
human nature (at least certain aspects of it) would seem to contain certain
features that are fixed; ones that we could call phusis and not nomos.
The critic will argue that Porter's point regarding the scholastic use of the
nature/ convention distinction is in conflict with her claim that the theological standpoint of 12th century scholastic natural law does not yield up universally objective moral notions: "The Scholastic concept of the natural law,
precisely because of its specifically theological character, does not yield the
universally valid moral code that modem and contemporary natural law
theorists have attempted to provide" (p. 311, ct. p. 170). In other words, the
12th century scholastics, seemingly anticipating Plantinga's 20th century
"Advice to Christian Philosophers" have accepted certain philosophical and
theological starting points and are hence unable to claim that there is a universally valid moral code outside the special revelation of Scripture. The
critic will maintain tl1at Porter cannot have it both ways. She cannot hold to
the existence of objective pre-rational standing tendencies of the sort someone like Martha Nussbaum (see her "Non-relative Virtues: An Aristotelian
Approach," Midwest Studies in Philosophy XIII) might acknowledge as the
basis for a universal moral code, yet at the same time deny that such a universal moral code could be valid due to the various presuppositions that the
diversity of human thought brings to the table. Porter claims that the
scholastics do not deal with the issue of whether morality is "discovered or
constructed by human reason." (p. 307). But the critic will maintain that if
the nature / convention distinction can be invoked, then the existence of the
former implies that universally valid moral precepts (in some form or
another) are possible because they are grounded in human nature and cannot be eliminated from natural law theory.
For those who accept the arguments above, Porter's interpretation and
subsequent application of 12th century scholastic natural law to marriage,
sexual ethics and social ethics will not be persuasive. However, rather than
seeing her project as an impure form of natural law, it seems to me that there
is another way to assess the value of a truly remarkable and important book.
If one were to create a continuum of positions in Christian ethics at
either end of the continuum would be (as they have come to be called) a
"Kingdom ethic" and a "Creation ethic". Roughly, a Kingdom ethic stresses the fallen nature of human epistemic capabilities, voluntarism, and the
uniqueness of the Christian revelation (sola scriptura). Proponents of this
view would include the Reformers, most contemporary Evangelicals and

